

THE EFFECTS OF GROUP MEMBERSHIP AND PERCEIVED HUMANNESS OF VICTIMS ON MOTIVES FOR PUNISHMENT AND JUSTICE DECISIONS

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Abstract: Information about a victim's emotional state influences observers' justice-providing reactions. This study ($N = 124$) tested people's motives for distribution of justice depending on whether emotions with differential social value were experienced by a victim. Uniquely human (UH) emotions are highly valued compared to non-uniquely human (NUH) emotions as they differentiate humans from animals. Moreover, people attribute UH emotions more to ingroup than to outgroup members. Such a bias, however, does not occur regarding NUH emotions. During judgmental processes, motives for punishment may vary depending on whether the main goal is to punish past harm-doing (i.e., retributive motives for punishment), integrate harm-doers to the society and help them correct their behavior (i.e., restorative motives for punishment), or control harm-doer's future behavior through deterring or incapacitative practices (i.e., utilitarian motives for punishment). In line with our hypothesis, UH, as compared to NUH negative emotions of victims, triggered observer's utilitarian motives for punishment. Moreover, utilitarian motives were activated when ingroup victims experienced UH rather than NUH emotions. Unexpectedly, when outgroup victims experienced NUH negative emotions, utilitarian punishments were also triggered. Finally, as expected, emotions (UH as compared to NUH) and group membership (ingroup versus outgroup) of the victims had no effect on either retributive or restorative motives.

Key words: Infrahumanization, Intergroup relations, Justice, Punishment, Retributive motives, Restorative motives, Utilitarian motives

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INTRODUCTION

The role of emotions in justice-related phenomena has gained much attention over the last decades. Emotions are present at every step of a justice process. For instance, laws in many countries explicitly refer to and grant legitimacy to emotions by establishing categories of behaviors that are linked to emotionality (e.g., crimes of passion, hate crimes; Laster & O'Malley, 1996; Posner, 2000). In addition, various emotions are reported as crucial in justice decisions. Several studies have indeed examined the role in judgmental processes of specific emotions such as anger, contempt, shame, fear, worry, or disgust (Cassese & Weber, 2011; Hartnagel & Templeton, 2012; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999).

Rather than focusing on specific emotions, other scholars have chosen to investigate the influence of different categories of emotions in justice perceptions and retaliation. For instance, Barclay, Skarlicki, and Pugh (2005) revealed the prevalence of outward over inward-focused emotions in attribution of blame and retaliation. Outward emotions (i.e., emotions that are oriented towards others than the self) such as anger and hostility, usually lead to higher need for retaliation compared to inward emotions (i.e., emotions oriented towards oneself) such as shame or guilt. Yet, the inward-outward classification is just one way of approaching emotions. Other research has distinguished classes of emotions on other grounds. Specifically, Demoulin, Leyens et al. (2004) have differentiated emotions in terms of their human value (i.e., emotions that are experienced by both humans and animals vs. emotions that are uniquely experienced by human beings). Research that has examined the influence of the latter typology of emotions on justice decisions is, however, absent in the literature.

Moreover, although there is a profusion of studies that have examined the importance of emotions that perceivers experience while observing unjust situations and the emotions that drive harm-doers to commit transgression (Laster & O'Malley, 1996), very limited research exists on the role of emotions experienced by victims in justice decisions (Myers & Greene, 2004). In the latter perspective, prior studies have shown that "victim impact statements", that is, details of the harm suffered by the victim as well as the victim's feelings about the crime and the offender (Erez, 1991), are connected to intense emotional reactions among perceivers (Myers & Greene, 2004) and to the imposition of harsher punishment against the harm-doer (Forsterlee, Fox, Forsterlee, & Ho, 2004). In the present study, we go one step further and propose to investigate the role of victims' emotions with different human value on justice decisions.

Infra-humanization: Uniquely human and non-uniquely human emotions

According to infra-humanization theory (Leyens et al., 2000), two types of emotions are to be distinguished, namely, non-uniquely human emotions (NUH; e.g., anger, surprise, joy) and uniquely human ones (UH; e.g., hope, remorse, regret; Demoulin, Leyens et al., 2004). Contrary to NUH, UH emotions are assessed by lay perceivers as being uniquely experienced by the human species. They are perceived as involving high cognition and morality, being caused by internal rather than situational factors, being universally variant, occurring later in development, and having a long duration (Demoulin, Leyens et al., 2004). In sum, they are considered as having an increased social value.

Given their differential social value, biases have been observed with regards the attribution of UH and NUH emotions to others. For instance, individuals tend to reserve UH emotions to their ingroup and to deny such an experience to outgroup members (Demoulin, Rodriguez et al., 2004). Such bias does not occur with regards to NUH emotions, as those are perceived as being experienced by both animals and human beings equally (e.g., Leyens et al., 2001). According to infra-humanization theory, the latter bias reveals individuals' tendency to reserve full humanness for themselves and to ascribe a lesser human status to outgroups. Importantly, emotional valence does not moderate these effects as people attribute to the ingroup, but not the outgroup, both negative and positive UH emotions (Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, & Leyens, 2005; Leyens et al., 2001).

In addition to the differential attributions of UH and NUH emotions to ingroups and outgroups, biases are also displayed with regards to individuals' reactions to people that express themselves by means of UH emotions. For instance, the expression of UH emotions by ingroup members induces pro-social reactions from the part of the perceiver (Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2002, 2006). In addition, such UH emotional expression among ingroup members tends to increase the perspective taking capacities of the observers (Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2004). These effects do not hold true when outgroup members express UH.

Thus, the human value of the emotions that victims experience might have an important impact on observers' responses to them and might be moderated by the group status of the victims. In line with these results, we suggest that UH emotions experienced by victims of a crime should impact justice-providing reactions differently when the victims are part of a group to which the observer belongs or to a group to which she does not belong. In the next two sections, we elaborate on these justice-providing reactions and explain why emotional statements of victims of crimes should affect them.

Justice-providing reactions

The literature distinguishes three different kinds of motives for sentencing: utilitarian motives (Bentham, 1970), retributive or just deserts motives (Kant, 1952), and restorative or rehabilitation motives (de Beaumont & de Tocqueville, 1833; Saleilles, 1898).

Utilitarian motives for punishment aim to reduce the likelihood of offenses in the future and thus at the maximization of happiness and minimization of suffering among many other people (see Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Nagin, 1998; Van Prooijen, 2018). The purpose of utilitarian punishments is to control the offenders' behavior through deterrence of future crimes or incapacitation of a known liability to society (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). Deterrence assumes that the offender is a rational person who has designed and deliberately committed an offense and calculated the expected benefits in relation to the expected costs (e.g., likelihood and severity of punishment). Incapacitation assumes that the offender is unable to act rationally and needs to be restrained, into a legal quarantine (e.g., prison) so that the prevalence of crime is reduced. Utilitarian punishment implies a zero-tolerance punishment (Nagin, 1998) and traditionally includes sentences like long-time incarceration, capital punishment, deportation, or disbarment (see Carlsmith & Darley, 2008).

In contrast to utilitarian punishing practices, *retributive/just deserts* punishments are based on the moral philosophy of deontology according to which punishment must be proportionate to the harm inflicted. Retributive punishment's objective is not preventing future offenses per se, but retaliating for perpetrators' past behavior (Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999; see also Van Prooijen, 2018). As put by Immanuel Kant (1952): "*punishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another good, and should be pronounced over all criminals proportionate to the internal wickedness*" (p. 397).

Finally, *restorative* punishments (de Beaumont & de Tocqueville, 1833; Saleilles, 1898) apply corrective treatment towards offenders. It serves as a tool to educate and prepare offenders to integrate to the society (see Van Prooijen, 2018). In this perspective, both the needs of the victims and the harm-doers are being taken into consideration. Restoration encourages offenders to take responsibility for their actions and to "repair" the harm inflicted. This can be achieved through several means which include, for instance, apology, community service, returning of stolen objects-money, and so on. Restorative justice focuses on the harm-doer as a person and not on the harm as an action that requires punishment. It emphasizes the need to improve harm-doer's "personality", to repair the relationship between the harm-doer and the

victim, and to alter the harm-doer's future behavior by means of adequate treatment (Zehr, 1997). Restorative justice has been associated to high rates of victim satisfaction and offender accountability (Roseman, Ritchie, & Laux, 2009). Given that restoration is quite empathic to offenders and aims to help harm-doers improve their behavior and reintegrate to the society, we do not consider restorative motives as punishing practices. Yet, we included restorative motives to our study as an alternative justice reaction of observers to harm-doing.

The role of perceived humanness in justice-providing reactions

A recent study explored the effects of perceived sentence of *harm-doers* on motives for punishing them (Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 2013). Sentence is defined as the capacity to feel and experience emotions (Pitcher, 1971) and is associated with people's humanness (Haslam, 2006). The research showed that when victims perceive harm-doers as having high sentence they display increased preference for restorative (more empathic) over retributive justice-providing reactions. Such preferential attitude for restoration then allows for an easier resolution of the conflict between the parties (Leidner et al., 2013).

What the latter research suggests is that perceived humanness of the harm-doer does have an influence on justice-related decisions. Similarly, Bastian, Denson, and Haslam (2013) showed that when harm-doers are viewed as having sub-human traits harsher punishments are preferred. Although retributive motives for punishment were assessed in this study, utilitarian or restorative motives were neglected. In a similar vein, Vasiljevic and Viki (2013), suggested that dehumanization of harm-doers leads to the perception that harm-doers cannot be rehabilitated, and therefore deserve harsher punishments. Harsher punishments include more extreme torture, incarceration or death penalty. These kinds of punishment are also linked to more utilitarian practices including deterrence and incapacitation of the offenders.

Clearly, humanness perceptions of harm-doers influence justice-providing reactions. But humanness perceptions of the victims can also play a central role in those reactions. Because the emotions experienced by victims vary in social value and reflect on their humanness level, we propose that these emotions should differentially impact observers' reactions. In the next section, we delineate more specifically the hypotheses that we will test.

Aims and hypotheses

Past research has shown that individuals display higher retributive than utilitarian

motives while assigning punishment to harm-doers (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Rozin et al., 1999). This is explained by the general tendency to view punishment of past behaviors as fairer. Indeed, there seems to be a general dislike of punishments which serve prospective goals such as controlling harm-doers' future behavior. In other words, people's intuitions of justice are retributive rather than utilitarian in nature (Carlsmith, 2008; Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Darley & Pittman, 2003). However, some studies have also suggested that when people perceive the harm inflicted to the victims as highly damaging, they assign more costly punishments to harm-doers (Xiao & Houser, 2005). In line with this, and because UH emotions are viewed as having higher cognitive and social value as compared to NUH emotions (see Demoulin, Leyens et al., 2004), we hypothesized that observers would exhibit a higher overall willingness to punish harm-doers and would evaluate harm-doer's behavior more negatively when UH than NUH emotions are inflicted to the victim (Hypothesis 1).

Accordingly, we expected that observers would display more utilitarian motives for punishing a harm-doer who has caused negative UH than NUH emotions to the victim to prevent them from repeating the highly-damaging harmful behavior (Hypothesis 2).

As far as group membership of the victim is concerned, because suffering of ingroup victims with UH emotions is viewed as more damaging and severe (see also Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Vaes et al., 2002, 2006), we predicted that overall willingness to punish a harm-doer would be higher, and harm-doer's behavior would be evaluated more negatively when observers face an ingroup rather than an outgroup victim who has suffered UH emotions (Hypothesis 3).

Consistently, more utilitarian than retributive punishment would be assigned to harm-doers that face an ingroup victim with UH emotions (Hypothesis 4).

Observer's reactions to outgroup members that experience UH emotions are quite different from those to ingroup members. Specifically, research has suggested that the experience of UH emotions by outgroup members does not trigger any increase in perspective taking like ingroup members do. Consequently, the shift from retributive to utilitarian motives that we hypothesized for ingroup member victims would not occur when observers examine the case of an outgroup victim (Hypothesis 5).

Further, when negative NUH emotions are being experienced by either an ingroup or an outgroup victim, the detrimental aspect of harm would be weak. Indeed, NUH emotions have a lessened social value, are not informative about the victim's level of humanness and, therefore, observer's willingness to assign punishments and evaluation of harm-doer's behavior would not differ for ingroup or outgroup victims when NUH emotions are being experienced. In line with this, motives for punishment would follow the default pattern of retribution being more important than deterrence from future crimes (Hypothesis 6).

As explained earlier, restorative justice instead of punishing harm-doers aims to help them improve their behavior and reintegrate to the society. For this reason, we did not consider restorative motives as punishing reactions in this study. Nevertheless, we included restorative motives to our research as an alternative justice reaction to harm-doing, although we did not state any specific hypotheses about this kind of motives.

METHOD

Design of the study

A 2 (Group membership of the victim: Ingroup / Outgroup) x 2 (Emotions experienced by the victim: UH emotions / NUH emotions) between-subjects experimental design was conducted.

Participants

One hundred and twenty-four Greek/Cypriot students living in the Greek/Cypriot area of Cyprus took part in this study (32 males, 73 females, 19 missing; $M_{age} = 23$ years). The present sample gives 95% power to detect an effect size of $f^2 = .08$. The research was conducted online through Qualtrics, while the link with the questionnaire was disseminated to undergraduate students of several departments in Greek/Cypriot universities (70% of participants were psychology students while 30% came from several departments of social and political sciences).

Materials

A vignette was presented to participants describing an intentional harm (the circumstances were such that the perpetrator knew that the outcome was morally wrong) that the perpetrator caused to the victim. Given that unintentional harms do not trigger any motives to assign punishment to the harm-doer (see Darley & Pittman, 2003) this study involved an intentional harm. No excuses or justifications for the harm were provided.

The vignette presented a fraudulent case. According to the vignette, some people (harm-doers) approached their victims by introducing themselves as sellers of technology products in a well-known company. Specifically, the harm-doers claimed that they were sellers working in a company that sells second-hand smart-phones in

excellent condition and on a low price. The smartphones that were finally sold to the three victims were fake (imitation), while the sellers were neither truly occupied in the company in question, nor the documentation (receipt and guarantee) they provided to the victims was legal. The three victims paid 1,450 euros in total for the purchase of three fake smart-phones. The harm-doers were eventually arrested by the police. Emotions experienced by the victims and group membership of the victims were manipulated as follows:

Emotions experienced by the victim: Participants were informed that as a result of the fraudulent behavior a group of three persons revealed having experienced either UH negative emotions (humiliation, despair, anxiety) or NUH negative emotions (panic, sadness, worry). The UH / NUH emotions were selected from the Demoulin, Leyens et al.'s (2004) list of emotions while a pilot study tested the perceived humanness of these emotions in the Greek context (Sakalaki, Richardson, & Fousiani, 2017).

Group membership of the victim: Since participants of this study were Greek/Cypriots, the outgroup victim was presented as having Turkish nationality, and the ingroup victim as having Greek/Cypriot nationality. It is noteworthy that Greek/Cypriots living in the Greek/Cypriot area of Cyprus are in a protracted conflict with Turkish/Cypriots and especially with Turks after the occupation of the northern part of Cyprus by Turks in 1974. For this reason, we chose Turks as the outgroup members of our participants. As the focus of this study lies on the effects of victims' group membership on punishment motive, the group membership of the offender remained undefined.

After participants read the vignettes, manipulation checks followed: 1) Victims were: *Greek/Cypriots / Turks*. 2) The emotions that victims experienced were: *panic, sadness and worry / humiliation, anxiety, and despair*.

Measures

Willingness to assign punishments

A two-item scale assessed willingness to assign punishments to harm-doers for the harm they caused (e.g., "*The perpetrators deserve to be punished for what they did*"; 1 = absolutely disagree, 7 = absolutely agree). Cronbach's alpha was .80.

Evaluation of harm-doer's behavior

Participants were asked to evaluate harm-doer's behavior on one item (1 = praiseworthy, 7 = reprehensible).

Motives for punishment

A 16-item scale was developed for the assessment of the various motives for punishment, including a) utilitarian motives and its sub-dimensions (private deterrence, public deterrence and incapacitation¹), b) retributive motives, and c) restorative/rehabilitative motives for punishment (1 = absolutely disagree, 7 = absolutely agree). The scale is presented in Appendix I. Cronbach's alpha for this scale was .71. Cronbach's alpha separately for each subscale of motives for punishment were as follows: for utilitarian motives, $\alpha = .82$; for retributive motives, $\alpha = .65$, and for restorative motives, $\alpha = .67$.

All the above scales were inspired by similar scales used by Carlsmith (2008) and by Kugler and colleagues (2013).

Procedure

This research involves human participants. All procedures performed in this study were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards. Participation in the study was anonymous and voluntary. After the completion of the study participants were thanked and debriefed.

RESULTS

Willingness to assign punishments and evaluation of harm-doer's behavior


A 2 (Group membership of the victim: Ingroup/ Outgroup) x 2 (Emotions of the victim: UH/NUH) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted with willingness to assign punishments and evaluation of harm-doer's behavior as the main dependent variables, $F(2, 117) = 5.24, p = .007, \eta_p^2 = .08$.


Contrary to Hypothesis 1, the results revealed no main effect of the victim emotions on willingness to punish harm-doers, $F(1, 118) = 2.07, p = .15, \eta_p^2 = .02$. Similarly, the main effect of group membership on willingness to punish harm-doers was not significant, $F(1, 118) = .29, p = .59, \eta_p^2 = .002$. Corroborating Hypothesis 3,

¹ The literature distinguishes between deterrent private, deterrent public, and incapacitative motives for punishment. All these motives aim at controlling harm-doer's future behavior and are therefore put under the umbrella of utilitarian motives for punishment (see Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). We did not refer to each of those dimensions separately as we did not assume any differences between them. Instead, we calculated a general mean, indicating utilitarian motives for punishment.

however, there was a significant interaction between group membership and emotions of victims on willingness to punish harm-doers, $F(1, 118) = 9.65, p = .002, \eta_p^2 = .08$. The interaction revealed higher willingness to punish the harm-doer when ingroup ($M = 6.47, SD = .81$) than outgroup members ($M = 5.89, SD = 1.16$) experience UH negative emotions, $F(1,118) = 3.41, p = .06, \eta_p^2 = .03$] (see Figure 1). Unexpectedly, the interaction also revealed higher willingness to punish harm-doers when NUH negative emotions were inflicted on outgroup as opposed to ingroup members ($M_{ing} = 5.44, SD = 1.58, M_{outg} = 6.26, SD = 1.32$).

In so far as the evaluation of harm-doers' behavior is concerned, contrary to Hypothesis 1, neither the emotions, $F(1, 118) = .81, p = .37, \eta_p^2 = .007$, nor the group membership of the victims, $F(1, 118) = .23, p = .63, \eta_p^2 = .002$, had a significant effect on the evaluation of harm-doer's behavior. There was, however, a significant interaction between group membership and emotions of victims, and evaluation of harm-doers' behavior, $F(1, 118) = 4.24, p = .04, \eta_p^2 = .04$. The interaction revealed more negative evaluation of harm-doers for having caused negative UH emotions to the ingroup rather than the outgroup, $M_{ing} = 6.81, SD = .48, M_{outg} = 6.50, SD = .79$, confirming and strengthening Hypothesis 3 (see Figure 2). Unexpectedly, observers also evaluated negatively harm-doers for having caused negative NUH emotions to the outgroup ($M = 6.75, SD = .62$) compared to the ingroup ($M = 6.41, SD = .93$).





Motives for punishment

A 2 (Group membership of the victim: Ingroup/ Outgroup) x 2 (Emotions of the victim: UH/NUH) x 3 (Motives for punishment: utilitarian, retributive, restorative) analysis of variance with repeated measures was conducted with the last factor as within-subjects, $F(2, 107) = 3.41, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .06$.

Participants displayed in general lower utilitarian and higher restorative motives for punishing the harm-doer ($M_{\text{util}} = 4.00, SD = 1.21, M_{\text{retr}} = 5.15, SD = 1.22, M_{\text{rest}} = 5.39, SD = 1.24$), $F(2, 216) = 45.44, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .30$. Importantly, there was a significant interaction between emotions of the victim and motives for punishment, $F(2, 216) = 3.20, p = .04, \eta_p^2 = .03$ (see Table 1). The effect was marginally significant for utilitarian motives for punishment, $F(1, 110) = 3.05, p = .08, \eta_p^2 = .027$. In line with Hypothesis 2, observers assigned higher utilitarian punishments when UH ($M = 4.20, SD = 1.19$) rather than NUH negative emotions ($M = 3.80, SD = 1.21$) were inflicted to the victims. The effect was not significant for either retributive, $F(1, 110) = .22, p = .64, \eta_p^2 = .002$ ($M_{UH} = 5.20, SD = 1.21, M_{NUH} = 5.09, SD = 1.24$) or restorative motives for punishment, $F(1, 110) = 1.94, p = .167, \eta_p^2 = .017$ ($M_{UH} = 5.23, SD = 1.33, M_{NUH} = 5.55, SD = 1.14$). Further, results revealed a nonsignificant interaction between group membership of the victims and motives for punishment, $F(2, 216) = 1.45, p = .24, \eta_p^2 = .013$.

Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations (in italics) for motives for punishment when UH and NUH emotions are experienced by either an ingroup or an outgroup victim

Motives for punishment	Emotions	
	UH	NUH
Utilitarian motives	4.20 <i>(1.19)</i>	3.80 <i>(1.21)</i>
Retributive motives	5.20 <i>(1.21)</i>	5.09 <i>(1.24)</i>
Restorative motives	5.23 <i>(1.33)</i>	5.55 <i>(1.14)</i>

Note: All ratings were on 7-point scales ranging from 1 = absolutely disagree to 7 = absolutely agree.

Finally, and most importantly, the interaction between group membership of the victim, emotions of the victims and motives for punishment was significant, $F(2, 216) = 3.98, p = .02, \eta_p^2 = .04$] (see Table 2). To probe this interaction, we calculated the interaction between group membership of the victim and motives for punishment at each level of emotions. The interaction was significant for NUH emotions, $F(2, 106) = 5.08, p = .008, \eta_p^2 = .087$, but not for UH emotions, $F(2, 110) = .52, p = .597, \eta_p^2 = .009$.

Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations (in italics) for motives for punishment when UH and NUH emotions are experienced by either an ingroup or an outgroup victim

Motives for punishment	UH emotions		NUH emotions	
	Ingroup	Outgroup	Ingroup	Outgroup
Utilitarian motives	4.35 <i>(1.28)</i>	4.07 <i>(1.11)</i>	3.36 <i>(1.16)</i>	4.18 <i>(1.13)</i>
Retributive motives	5.42 <i>(1.15)</i>	5.00 <i>(1.25)</i>	4.92 <i>(1.26)</i>	5.23 <i>(1.23)</i>
Restorative motives	5.21 <i>(1.36)</i>	5.25 <i>(1.33)</i>	5.86 <i>(1.07)</i>	5.30 <i>(1.15)</i>


Note: All ratings were on 7-point scales ranging from 1 = absolutely disagree to 7 = absolutely agree.

As a next step, we checked into the simple interaction effects of victim’s group membership and motives for punishment at NUH emotions of the victim. Results revealed significantly higher utilitarian motives for punishment when the victim experienced NUH emotions and was an outgroup ($M = 4.18, SD = 1.13$) rather than an ingroup member ($M = 3.36, SD = 1.16$), $F(1, 108) = 6.64, p = .011, \eta_p^2 = .058$. These findings are not in line with Hypothesis 6.

With respect to retributive motives for punishment the mean difference between

ingroup and outgroup victims was not significant when NUH emotions were caused to the victim, $F(1, 108) = .89, p = .35, \eta_p^2 = .008$. Similarly, as regards restorative motives for punishment the mean difference for ingroup and outgroup victims was not significant when NUH emotions were inflicted to the victim, $F(1, 108) = 2.86, p = .09, \eta_p^2 = .026$ (see Table 2 for the means).

Finally, we tested the interaction between emotions caused to the victim and motives for punishment at each level of group membership of the victim. The interaction came out significant for the ingroup victims, $F(2, 100) = 6.37, p = .002, \eta_p^2 = .113$. In line with Hypothesis 4, results revealed significantly higher utilitarian motives for punishment when ingroup victims experienced UH ($M = 4.35, SD = 1.28$) rather than NUH emotions ($M = 3.36, SD = 1.16$), $F(1, 108) = 9.182, p = .003, \eta_p^2 = .08$ (see Figure 3). As regards retributive motives for punishment the mean difference between UH and NUH emotions was not significant for the ingroup victims, $F(1, 108) = 2.131, p = .15, \eta_p^2 = .019$. Similarly, with respect to restorative motives for punishment, the mean difference between UH and NUH emotions was not significant for the ingroup victims, $F(1, 108) = 3.664, p = .058, \eta_p^2 = .033$ (see Table 2 for the means). Corroborating Hypothesis 5, the interaction between emotions caused to the victim and motives for punishment was not significant for the outgroup victims, $F(2, 116) = .09, p = .912, \eta_p^2 = .002$.



DISCUSSION

This study aimed to explore how emotions with differential social value in terms of humanness may affect justice decisions. Ample research indicates the importance of observer's emotional reaction on judgmental processes (Cassese & Weber, 2011; Frijda, 1996; Karstedt, 2002; Rozin et al., 1999). Very limited research exists, however, on the role of victim's emotions on justice-related decisions (Forsterlee et al., 2004; Myers & Green, 2004). The main goal of the present study was to examine the impact of emotions with differential social value and cognitive complexity (Leyens et al., 2000; Demoulin, Leyens et al., 2004) on justice-related phenomena.

Although people's intuitions of justice are retributive rather than utilitarian, (Carlsmith, 2008; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley & Pittman, 2003) this study showed that justice-providing reactions may be oriented to serving prospective goals (i.e., utilitarian) when emotions with high social value are involved in immoral-doing. In general, and in line with the literature, the findings demonstrated a higher tendency of the observers to apply retributive or restorative rather than utilitarian punishments when it comes to decision making for harm-doing (Carlsmith, 2008; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley & Pittman, 2003). However, in line to our expectations, more utilitarian motives to punish harm-doers were triggered when uniquely human (UH) negative emotions were caused to the victims, aiming to deter harm-doers from future transgressions or even incapacitate them. This was not the case, however, when negative non-uniquely human (NUH) emotions were experienced by victims. This finding provides full support to our hypothesis. Interestingly, humanness of victim's emotions did not interact with either retributive or restorative motives for punishment, a finding that strengthens our hypotheses. Contrary to the latter two types, utilitarian motives for punishment are triggered when the perceived detrimental aspect of the harm is high. Utilitarian punishments are associated with zero-tolerance, are rationally oriented and aim to control future crime (Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Nagin, 1998) and might play a more active role in the protection of the victims. Activation of utilitarian motives for punishment when UH emotions are being experienced reveals the increased value that people place on UH emotions and their tendency to protect victims when they suffer by this type of emotions.

Moreover, there was a significant interaction between victim's group membership, victim's experienced emotions and motives for punishment, confirming partly our predictions. Specifically, individuals assigned more utilitarian punishment when the offender caused negative UH as compared to NUH emotions to an ingroup victim. This finding corroborates our hypothesis and is in line with prior research that stresses the increased responsiveness of observers when ingroup members express UH emotions (Vaes et al., 2002, 2006). Unexpectedly, utilitarian motives for punishment

were also activated when outgroup as compared to ingroup victims experienced negative NUH emotions. According to the literature, the social value of NUH emotions is weak and no biases in the observer's reactions are displayed when NUH emotions are experienced by either ingroup or outgroup members (Vaes et al., 2002, 2006). NUH emotions are simpler emotions, with less cognitive complexity or duration (see Demoulin, Leyens et al., 2004).

It seems, however, that under certain conditions, especially when suffering or victimization cases are involved, NUH emotions can activate biases in justice decision making. At least from the perspective of an observer, it has been shown that pain (a NUH emotion) gives rise to more aggressive and punitive reactions (Berkowitz, 1993). In the same line, anger (also NUH emotion) is a sufficient cause of punishment (Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009) and significant predictor of punitive attitudes (Johnson, 2009) when violence and suffering are salient. However, what is remarkable in this study is that the less cognitively complex and low in social value NUH emotions trigger harsher motives for punishing a harm-doer only when they are experienced by outgroup rather than ingroup victims. These results are in accordance with the pattern we found on willingness for punishing the harm-doer and the evaluation of the harm-doer's behavior. Specifically, observers reported stronger willingness to punish a harm-doer who has inflicted negative UH emotions on an ingroup victim but negative NUH emotions on an outgroup victim. In a similar vein, observers evaluated harm-doer's behavior more negatively when they faced an ingroup victim suffering from negative UH emotions and an outgroup victim experiencing negative NUH emotions. Obviously, when outgroup victims suffer NUH negative emotions observers evaluate harm-doers more negatively, display higher need to control future crime and protect victims by applying utilitarian punishments.

This pattern of results possibly reveals an alternative way of infra-humanizing outgroup victims by reacting in a protecting for them way when they experience low-order emotions, such as NUH emotions. Based on the present findings, we cannot conclude with certainty if humanness of emotions experienced by ingroup or outgroup victims influences distribution of justice. Future research should replicate and further investigate the role of perceived humanness of victims on motives for punishment and justice decisions.

Implications of the study, limitations and future directions

The role that UH versus NUH emotions may play in justice-related phenomena has both theoretical and practical implications. As far as the theoretical implications are concerned, there is very limited research on the role of infrahumanization of the victims in justice-decisions (Marcu, Lyons, & Hegarty, 2007; Vasiljevic & Viki, 2013).

Moreover, the already existing research investigated solely retributive motives for punishment or restorative motives, while utilitarian motives for punishment are often neglected. Besides, the present research makes a theoretical contribution to the literature on victim impact statement (Myers & Greene, 2004) highlighting the effects that victims' emotions with differential value (UH / NUH) might have on justice.

In so far as practical implications are concerned, we deem necessary to detect potential biases in decision making depending on the group membership of the persons involved in the immoral-doing and the type of emotions that have been experienced, to prevent prejudicial justice-related decisions.

This study has significant limitations, including the use of self-report, recently developed instruments and the reliance on one single experiment. First, the use of self-report scales that were developed for the needs of the present study for the assessment of all dependent variables (motives for punishment, willingness to punish, and evaluation of harm-doer's behavior) may have led to an over or underestimation of the association between these constructs and the experimental manipulations. Future research should focus on the development of valid scales for the assessment of those variables. Moreover, further experimental designs should test the replication of the present findings in different intergroup contexts than Cyprus so that generalizability of the results is allowed. It is possible that in different cultural backgrounds the perceived role of emotions and the reactions to others' suffering might vary. Finally, women are overrepresented in this study. This presumably happens because psychology students in Cyprus are mostly females. Future research should replicate this study considering this limitation.

Conclusion

Taken together, these results reveal an interconnection between perceived humanness of the victims and justice-providing reactions. UH negative emotions are viewed as highly detrimental and concerning, and therefore activate utilitarian motives for punishment, aiming to control future harm. These findings are in line with prior research that shows that more pro-social attitudes are displayed when UH emotions are involved (Cuddy et al., 2007; Vaes et al., 2006). Although utilitarian motives for punishment seem to be triggered when UH negative emotions are experienced by the ingroup victim, contrary to our expectations, utilitarian motives for punishment were also displayed for harms inflicted to an outgroup victim that experienced NUH emotions. This is a controversial and at the same time interesting finding that points out the necessity for future research on the role that emotions and group dynamics might exert in justice related decisions. For a more holistic view of the topic, the role of harm-doers' group membership in justice decisions should be explored as well.

APPENDIX I

Motives for Punishment scale

- 1) We must protect the society; the perpetrators must be punished so that the other people are better protected. (utilitarian)
- 2) The society should publicly punish the perpetrators in order to shame them and set an example to others showing that such behaviors are not allowed. (utilitarian)
- 3) The perpetrators should be assigned a very severe punishment so that they regret what they did and do not repeat this behavior in the future. (utilitarian)
- 4) The perpetrators should be assigned a punishment equivalent to the magnitude of their transgression; not more lenient or harsher than that. (retribution)
- 5) The only goal of the punishment assigned to the perpetrators should be to make them pay for what exactly they did; nothing more and nothing less than that. (retribution)
- 6) A very severe punishment should be assigned to the perpetrators so that they don't repeat this behavior in the future. The punishment, however, should be assigned in person rather than publicly. (utilitarian)
- 7) The punishment assigned to the perpetrators should only aim to make them pay for their transgression. It is important that the punishment be equivalent to the transgression committed. (retribution)
- 8) It is very likely that the perpetrators will repeat this behavior in the future, so it is very important the rest of the people to be protected. The only way to protect the people is to punish the perpetrators with a very severe punishment. (utilitarian)
- 9) The perpetrators should be punished by a punishment proportionate to their transgression. One must pay for exactly what one has committed. (retribution)
- 10) The perpetrators should be expelled from the society; it is the only way for the society to protect the people. (utilitarian)
- 11) The best and most humane way to address this sort of behavior is to offer the perpetrators the chance to recognize the error of their ways, to improve themselves, and in turn, to reintegrate to the society. (restoration)
- 12) Educational programs should be developed to help perpetrators improve themselves; punishment measures would be a failure. (restoration)
- 13) The perpetrators should be privately punished by the authorities so that they do not repeat such behaviors in the future. The sanctions imposed shouldn't be public. (utilitarian)

- 14) The perpetrators should be assigned a really harsh and public punishment so that others know just how much the society rejects such behaviors. (utilitarian)
- 15) The sanctions imposed to the perpetrators should have as a single goal to help them understand that what they did was wrong and improve their behavior so that they can reintegrate to the society. (restoration)
- 16) The perpetrators should be assigned a really harsh and public punishment so that the society sets an example to others that this is a totally rejected behavior. (utilitarian)

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